During the last few years,
so-called decoding approaches have been providing novel information about the
neural basis of cognitive functions at a rapidly increasing pace. The strength
of such machine-learning algorithms is in that they make it possible to find
distributed patterns of brain activity that are associated with specific mental
states and cognitive processes. Decoding studies have, for example, disclosed
specific distributed replicable “signature” patterns of brain activity that represent
perceptual object categories such as chairs, tables, and butterflies within
specific visual cortical areas. Studies attempting to decode higher-order
cognitive processes such as inferring intentions of other persons represent in
many ways the next major step forward in cognitive neuroscience.
In their recent study, Dr.
Koster-Hale et al. (2013) conducted four
functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments in healthy volunteers and in subjects
with high-functioning autism-spectrum disorder to decode brain hemodynamic response patterns
that underlie mental state reasoning, i.e.,
hold representations of others’ beliefs and intentions. In two of the studies,
the healthy and autistic subjects were reading short stories of intended vs. non-intended harms vs. neutral stories in second person,
and were to indicate with button presses after each story how much blame they
ought to get from none to very much.
In the other two studies, short stories describing intentional harms vs.
accidental harms vs. harmless actions were read in third person, and the subjects were to
either make moral judgments (from “forbidden” to “permissible”) or were to
provide a true/false answer to a question concerning the stories.
The authors observed that
difference between accidental and intentional harmful actions in the short stories was decodable
from replicable and specific patterns of hemodynamic activity within the right
temporo-parietal junction. These patterns further predicted on the
invididual-participant level differences in moral judgments: individuals with
more distinct activity patterns between intentional and accidental harm
conditions in right temporo-parietal junction exhibited stronger moral judgment of intentional harms as contrast
to accidental harms. As the third major finding, the authors report that these
findings are absent in their group of subjects suffering from high-functioning
type of autism spectrum disorder, and indeed individuals with this diagnosis are known
to make moral judgments less on the basis of intent information than neurotypical
control subjects. Together, these findings very nicely demonstrate the power of
decoding approach in elucidating cerebral processing that supports higher-order
cognitive processes such as mental-state inference, and show the pivotal role of right temporo-parietal junction in mental-state inference.
Reference: Koster-Hale J, Saxe R,
Dungan J, Young LL. Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of
intentions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA (2013) e-publication ahead of print.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1207992110
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